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L.  Introduction and Rationale
Recent global financial  crises (East Asia, 1997; Russia, 1998; Brazil, 1999) have refocused
the attention of economists and policy makers on the search for an exchange rate regime that could
minimize,  and optimally  isolate a country from the impact of external financial  shocks on the
domestic economy, especially  on domestic output and employment. That search, and its ensuing
policy debate, has been particularly  relevant for emerging economies  that embraced  international
financial  integration (i.e., open capital accounts) in the late 1980s and early 1990s  to underpin
broader efforts at structural reform.
At one end of the spectrum, proponents of various forms of rigid foreign exchange systems
(traditional fixed, currency boards, unilateral dollarization,  monetary associations, monetary unions)
cite lower inflation  and domestic interest rates, reduced cost of external  borrowing through lower
country risk premia, and confidence-driven  increases  in long-term foreign direct investment among
the key benefits that the elimination  of nominal  volatility in the exchange rate brings about.'  If they
indeed accrue, these benefits may not be costless. As those in favor of flexible  foreign exchange
regimes point out, emerging market economies which choose to fix their exchange rate (or to give
up their own currency completely) may suffer greater real output volatility, for two main  reasons:
they effectively  forego monetary policy as a tool to smooth short-term real-side fluctuations,  and
the likelihood  of abandoning  the fixed  foreign exchange regime is not zero (see, for example,
' For a good  listing  of the generally  purported  benefits  of dollarization,  see  Costs  and  Benefits  of Dollarization  in
Latin  America;  Testimony  Before  the U.S. Senate,  Manuel  Hinds,  January  1999. For a good  roundtable-type
discussion  on the cost  and  benefits  of currency  boards,  see;  Currency  Boards  and  External  Shocks:  How  Much  Pain,
How  Much Gain?,  edited  by Guillermo  Perry.
2Osakwe and Schembri  [1999], Flood and Hodrick [1986], Flood and Marion [1982], Dornbusch
[1976]).
However, while real output volatility has been addressed by the literature as a factor in the
choice of optimal foreign  exchange regimes, scant attention has been given to the time necessary
for real output to return to its trend after an adverse  external financial  shock takes place, that is,
persistence.  This appears particularly  relevant for emerging  markets, where seamless  neo-classical
adjustments in labor markets are all but absent. In recent empirical  research, Caporale, Kalyvitis,
and Pittis (1994) find evidence  of greater persistence in a number of real variables, including
industrial  production, in 18 OECD countries  after the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange  rate system. Their  work, which covers no emerging economies,  is based on the modified
re-scaled range statistic discussed  by Lo (1991), which is employed  to test for long term
persistence. They  reject the null  hypothesis of"no long-run memory"  for industrial  production in
both fixed and floating regimes  within the three month period following  a shock. For a test of nine
month persistence,  however, they find that they cannot reject the null  hypothesis of"no long run
memory"  for industrial  production in the fixed rate period, while  it can be rejected in the floating
period. Though this is an important contribution  to the empirical  issue of persistence under
alternate exchange regimes, it does not examine  any emerging  market economies. Additionally,  the
method of empirical  testing can yield neither an overall  picture relating  to the depth of a shock nor
a rough estimate of the length for which the shocks effect approaches zero, i.e., it is only able to
conclude that, for example,  there is evidence of persistence after 9 months, but not whether that
persistence diminishes  in the tenth month or when the series returns to its long run path.
This note contributes to the debate over optimal  foreign exchange  regimes  by reporting on
empirically  observed persistence  under alternative  foreign exchange arrangements. To control for
3country specific  characteristics,  it initially  focuses on a single,  globally  integrated, emerging
economy (Mexico's)  that has, during the period of observation,  experienced  both fixed  and flexible
foreign exchange  regimnes,  and that has seen adverse  external  financial  shocks  under both.
Mexico's flexible  regime period is then compared with an array of emerging  countries that
maintained  fixed exchange  rates with various levels  of rigidity. In all cases, persistence is estimated
by using the impulse  response  functions  obtained from estimating  a vector autoregressive  system
for a set of variables  traditionally  used to describe  a macroeconomic  system.
II. Empirical  Results
This section is based on a four-variable  VAR specification  whereby current real output is
ultimately  determined  by past output and the past values of the other three endogenous  variables.
That specification  is shown in Equation (1) and consists  of Industrial Production (Y), our measure
of real output, a domestic  Interest Rate (r),  Money (m), and Inflation (1),  where the subscript  i
reflects the time period for the lagged  variable  and its respective  coefficient  estimate, and I
represents the number of lags. 2
Yt = P0 +  2  fir,iri  +  E  6m,imi +  E  61,ixi  +  E  Yi,Yi +S  (I)
i=t-1  i=t-1
Table 1 shows  the countries  and their associated forms of foreign exchange  regimes  for
which  Equation 1 is estimated.  Additionally,  the number  of lags for each country's  VAR, and the
order of exogeneity  used in the impulse  response functions  are also shown in Table 1, as well as
2Money refers  to Broad Money, as  defined  in the IMF's  International  Financial  Statistics,  except  for  Estonia  where
M2  is  employed.  Additionally,  we  use  an indexed  measure  of  real  total  industrial  sales  for  Estonia.
4the length of the data, i.e., the time periods and corresponding  number of observations  used for
each country.
Table 1
Country  and  Type  of Regime  VAR-Model  /Ordering:  Rate Money CPI  IndProd
Country  Exchange  Rate Regime  Lags  Series Length*
Mexico  Pre  "Tequila"  Crawling  Peg  2  04 1987-11 1994  (92)
Mexico  Post  "Tequila"  Float  2  01 1995-02-2000 (62)
Brazil  Pre-Devaluation  Fixed  2  09 1994-12 1998  (52)
Thailand  (Pre-Devaluation)  Fixed  2  01 1990-06 1997 (88)
Latvia  Fixed  2  09 1993-02 2000  (77)
Estonia  Currency  Board  2  01 19902  2000  (74)
Hong  Kong  Currency  Board  1  03 1982-04 1998  (66)**
Argentina  Currency  Board  2  06 1994-03 2000  (69)
*number  of observations  in  parentheses,  **quarterly  data
Since there may likely  exist a long run equilibrium  relationship  among the four variables,
cointegration  tests among the data series were carried out using the likelihood  ratio test developed
by Johansen  (1988) rather than immediately  detrending  the data, working with the series in
differences,  and thus, likely mis-specifying  the model. If the null hypothesis  that, there does not
exist a cointegrating  vector for the system is rejected, then an unrestricted  VAR for each country in
the sample  is estimated  in levels (which  implicitly  fits the cointegrating  relation among the variables,
thereby accounting  for the long-run equilibrium  relationship  among  variables in the system). 3 Naka
and Tufte (1997) note several  advantages for estimating  VAR's in levels when a cointegrating
3 The  justification  for  estimating  an  unrestricted  VAR  in levels  when  the  variables  are  cointegrated  is attributed  to
the  research  results  established  byEngle  and  Granger  (1987).
5relation exists rather than employing  an error correction model. 4 Consequently,  the impulse
response functions  generated in this paper are the result of dynamic  multipliers  estimated from
unrestricted VAR models in levels when the null hypothesis of cointegration is not rejected.
Furthermore, the specification  of the VAR for each country with respect to the number of lags is
based upon the minimization  of the Schwarz criterion. 5 This criterion, compared to an alternate
criterion such as Akaike's  for example,  imposes a harsher penalty on added regressors which do not
augment the explanatory  power of the model, thus encouraging a more parsimonious  selection  of
lags in the model.
The impulse  response function ordering was based on standard neoclassical  macroeconomic
theory which reveals the variables that are endogenously  determined  in a system. More specifically,
we choose output as the most endogenous variable -determined  by the more exogenous domestic
rate of interest which is a function of external shocks (in the open capital account economies
covered by the country sample) and the global rate of interest. 6 We use nominal interest rates in
our empirical  model and separately  account for inflation  by incorporating a variable which reflects
changes in the price level. Thus, the VAR system implicitly  incorporates the variables  necessary  to
capture the real interest rate output-determining  investment  decisions made by rational agents.
Figure 1 displays the reaction of output to a one standard deviation  shock in interest rates as
well as the corresponding  standard error bounds for the group of countries used in the analysis.
4 Naka and Tufte  (1997)  point  out that there  is little evidence  that imposing  a cointegrating  vector  via a vector  error
correction  model  leads  to better  performance  at an horizons.  Additionally,  they  note  that  other  researchers  such  as
Engle  and Yoo  (1987),  Clements  and Hendry  (1995),  and  Hoffman  and Rasche  (1996)  show  that when  the
cointegrating  restriction  is true, unrestricted  VAR's  may  be more  efficient  than a restricted  error correction  model  at
short  horizons.
5 See  Greene  (1993)  for a complete  discussion  and comparison  of the 2 criteria.
6  The variable-ordering  sensitive  nature  of the impulse  response  functions  has been  highlighted  in the literature,
especially  the somewhat  arbitrary  nature  of the Choleski  decomposition  involved  in constructing  the impulse
responses.  In this  paper,  theory  guides  the  ordering  of  the  variables  in the  response  function  so  that  the  behavioral
relationships  variables,  such  as  interest  rates  and  output  for example,  are  properly  gleaned  from  the  empirical
6Before interpreting  the result, however, it is worth noting, as Rosensweig  and Tallman  (1993) point
out, that there is no general consensus  or specific  testing criteria  for evaluating  significance  in VAR
analysis. Here, a method similar  to that of Sims (1987) is followed, i.e., the significance  in VAR
analysis  is determined  by whether or not the response to innovations  are bounded away from zero.
Thus, error bands (plus and minus one standard deviation)  are computed and displayed  around the
response function  in order to yield some rough indication  of the statistical  significance  of the output
generated values  over the forecast horizon. Returning attention to Figure 1, we see that the
countries with the more rigid exchange  rate regime seem  to exhibit longer periods of adjustment  to
simulated  shocks, i.e., the simulated  shocks show more marked persistence  in those countries.
Figure 2 examines  the differential  length of output adjustment  to an economic  shock in Mexico
before and after that switch in exchange  rate regime (the switch did not affect the degree of capital
account openness).  As a reference  point, we use the so-called Tequila  Crisis of December 1994 in
which Mexico allowed  its nominal  exchange  rate to float six years after introducing  the Pacto of
1988, which called  for a freezing of the nominal exchange  rate to the dollar.  The shock is
represented by a one standard deviation  change  in the domestic nominal  interest rate. The simulated
interest rate shock has an immediate  negative  impact upon output, as expected. More importantly,
the time of adjustment  of output is notably longer  for Mexico under the Pre-Tequila  managed
exchange rate regime than for the Post-Tequila exchange  rate float.
estimation.
7Figure  1
One  Standard  Deviation  Shock  to Industrial  Production  for  Selected  Countries
Time Period  in Months,  (+/- One  standard  deviation  bound  included)
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That is, the one standard deviation  increase in the domestic interest rate leads to longer persistence
in output under the fixed regime than the floating  regime. The negative impact of the shock under
the floating  regime for Mexico lasts for about 6-9 months, while  Pre-Tequila  Mexico exhibits  a
response that is roughly between 14-18 months, or about two times longer.
A similar  exercise is then performed with data from countries which, over the period of
observation,  employed either a currency  board or a fixed exchange  rate regime. 7 Figure 3 shows
Post Crisis  Mexico's  response to a simulated  shock in interest rates compared to three other
countries which have fixed exchange rate regimes. The responses for Brazil and Thailand  are
estimated excluding  post-devaluation  data.  That is, the responses  for these two countries are
estimated using data which were generated  under their respective  fixed exchange  rate regime
periods (up to January 1999 and June 1997, respectively). From the response function, it is clear
7 The countries are chosen based upon readily available data and are not proposed as a complete sample of exchange
regimes.
9that while Mexico  recovers from the shock after about 6-9 periods, the responses of the other,
fixed exchange  rate countries  is noticeably  longer. Though the magnitude  of the simulated  shock to
Thailand's interest rate does not appear as large as that of the other countries,  there is still a
noticeably  longer period of adjustment  until the effect of the shock no longer persists. Care should
be exercised  in interpreting  the response function  for Thailand  since its upper standard  error bound
includes  zero over most of the forecast horizon.
Figure 3
Mexico-Post Crisis and Selected Fixed Exchange Rate Countries
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Brazil and Latvia on the other hand show a longer period of adjustment  than Mexico  to their
respective  shocks in interest rates. Brazil's shock seems  to persist for about one year, while  for
Latvia  the shock persists for about at least 2 years. 8 Again, as in the case for Thailand,  the upper
error band for Latvia encompasses  zero over most of the forecast horizon.
Next, Post-Tequila  Mexico's  response to shocks  is compared with three currency  board
countries. Figure 4 illustrates  the output responses  of Hong-Kong, Argentina,  and Estonia to
8  We  focus  here  on  the  relative  behavior  of  the  impulse  response  functions  with  respect  to one  another  over  the
forecast  horizon.  In other  words,  from  our  simulations  we  are  not  concerned  with  trying  to predict  precisely  how
10simulated  shocks in interest rates. The magnitude  of the shock for the currency  board countries is
apparently  deeper.
Though Estonian output exhibits  a first period positive  response to a one standard deviation
shock in its domestic  interest rate, it is immediately  followed  by the expected  negative output
response. This may  be partially  explained  by a lagged reaction of output to a current change in the
domestic interest rate.  From Figure 4, we see that the Estonian adjustment  process is more
prolonged  than that of the Mexican  output response following  the shock to interest rates. The
most striking  result in this chart is, however, the response functions  of Hong-Kong and Argentina
which show much  more marked shock persistence relative to Mexico. 9 Moreover, the standard
error bounds for Argentina and Hong Kong, do not approach zero for at least 24 months and 36
months respectively  out in the forecast horizon, thus yielding  a reasonable  indication  that the flatter
slopes of the response functions  are reflective  of a relatively  prolonged output adjustment  to a
shock in interest rates. Table 3 roughly summarizes  those empirical  results by listing the countries
in the sample and displaying  the approximate response time of output to a shock in interest rates,
all else constant.  10
many  periods  it takes  for a shock  to completely  dissipate,  but rather,  how  the response  functions  compare  with  one
another  across  countries.
9  The quarterly  data for  Hong-Kong  is interpolated  monthly  in order  to plot  the response  function  on  the same  axes
as the other countries. That is, one quarter for Hong-Kong is correspondingly  plotted once every three months, and
the interim  monthly  span  is interpolated.
'O  For standard error bands for the impulse response functions, see Figure 1.
11Figure  4
lkxico-Post Crisis and  Currency  Board  Countries
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Table 3
Approximate  Recovery  Time  for Output  from  a Shock  to Interest  Rates*
Country  Response time in Months
Mexico (Pre Devaluation)  12-18
Mexico  (Post  Devaluation)  6-12
Brazil (Pre-Devaluation)  12-18
Thailand (Pre-Devaluation)  18-24
Latvia  >24
Estonia  >18
Hong Kong  >48
Argentina  >48
*Measured by the time period at which the standard error bound crosses the horizontal axis
12Section m:  Conclusions  and Policy Considerations
The academic and policy debate over optimal  foreign exchange rate regimes  for emerging
economies  has focused extensively  on the theoretical  costs and benefits  of various possible regimes,
and to a lesser extent on their actual performance. This paper contributes to that debate by
reporting on what can be called exchange rate regime dependent differential shock persistence,
that is, the time that output takes to return to its trend after a negative  shock takes place, in a
sample of countries that encompass  a spectrum of nominal  foreign exchange  flexibility. It finds
strong evidence  that Mexico's output recovery was a) faster (a third as long) when the country's
policy-makers  let the nominal  exchange rate float than when they fixed it; and b) much faster than
in other developing  countries  that kept nominal  exchange  rates constant, especially  those which
resorted to currency board arrangements  to support that constancy.
While much research  has focused on volatility  in output, this note draws attention to the need
for possible future theoretical research to focus on models which link the persistence of real
variables  and the choice of a foreign  exchange regime in a dynamic  context. Future empirical  work
could also expand on this note in a number of areas,  namely by expanding  the scope of countries
and number of real variables  covered here or modeling  the persistence of shocks using a panel data
approach, which would include countries representing  alternate foreign  exchange regimes.
Though the results of this note are of course insufficient  to guide an optimal choice of
regime (they lack general equilibrium  value, and are based on a limited  sample of countries), they
may highlight  an important  practical consideration  in maidng  that choice -the  length of output
adjustment  periods after negative  shocks take place is in practice sensitive  to the level of rigidity in
the foreign exchange regime. This may prove a particularly  critical element  when the social costs of
those adjustments  are not negligible.
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